Blackhorse Hoofbeats

By: Don Snedeker, 11th ACVVC Historian

Echoes from the Regiment’s Service in Vietnam 1966 – 1972
Don Snedeker, 11th ACVVC Historian

Fort Defiance: There has been a Fort Defiance during many periods of American military history. Well before the Revolutionary War, English colonists built perhaps the first Fort Defiance in our history as they pushed westward from the coast into the as-yet unnamed Shenandoah Valley. General ‘Mad Anthony’ Wayne had a Fort Defiance built to protect his soldiers against the Native Americans in what would become Ohio (between Toledo and Detroit) in the late 18th Century. It was one of the western-most forts at the time it was built. Ten years before the Civil War began, another Fort Defiance was constructed in the Arizona Territory to establish a military presence among the Navajo Tribe. During the Civil War, slaves and black Freedmen built a fourth Fort Defiance for the Confederate Army near Clarksville, TN. Each of these forts had one thing in common – they were built in an area that was under constant threat of attack, with the name conveying the spirit of the defenders against all comers.

Vietnam, too, had its Fort Defiance. This Fort Defiance was built by the 919th Engineer Company on top of Hill 95. It was occupied by 2nd Squadron in March 1970. Like its predecessors, Fire Support Base (FSB) Fort Defiance was built in a place designed to irritate the enemy the most. It was in War Zone C, about 8 kilometers south of the Cambodian border and midway between Ka Tum and Ton Le Cham. As H Company 2nd Platoon Leader Bill Gregory recalled: “War Zone C out into Tay Ninh Province … was to us something from the movies, was Indian country. There was nobody out there except us and the bad guys … [W]e were right in the middle of their territory and we were daring them to mess with us, and they did.”

Like all of its precedents (except the one in Arizona), this Fort Defiance was built in the midst of an old forest; but the one in War Zone C was the only one that had jungle undergrowth mixed in with the trees that grew a hundred feet tall or so. The Red Devils of the 4th Platoon, 919th had to clear away some of the taller, as well as many shorter (30-40 feet tall) trees and bamboo, while Eagle Horse Squadron tracks crushed down the scrub brush and the carpet of foot-tall elephant grass. A 6-foot red clay berm surrounded the 150-meter circular FSB, with a string of concertina wire outside that. Claymores, trip flares, and a couple barrels of foogas [jellied gasoline] rounded out the perimeter defenses. Upon completion, the defenders inside Fort Defiance had fields of fire out to about 40 meters before the jungle blocked lines of sight. A landing pad for the daily resupply Chinook helicopters was cleared on the northwestern edge, just outside the berm.

The engineers also built a second berm, dividing Fort Defiance into a northern and a southern half. Howitzer Battery (minus two guns) and the Squadron tactical operations center (TOC) set up inside the southern half, while the aid station, commo and maintenance sections set up in the northern half. All of these were dug in, thanks to the 919th Engineers. Hotel Company tanks and 2/11 Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT) armored cavalry assault vehicles (ACAVs), as well as four M-42 Dusters and two Zippo tracks (flame-throwers), were spaced evenly around the outer perimeter; the perimeter berm was high enough for all vehicles to be in hull defilade. (A vehicle is in hull defilade when the hull is protected by a dirt berm or revetment, and the weapons can still fire over the earthworks; a vehicle in hull defilade presents a much smaller target for enemy gunners to try and hit.)

Fort Defiance was also home to a two-gun 8-inch section from the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, located next to 2nd-HOW in the southern half of the FSB. First Lieutenant Ralph Porter was assigned to the fire direction center (FDC) for Alpha Battery, 6/27th and remembers Fort Defiance: “Morale was high, even though we were being shot at regularly by snipers, mortars, RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades], and even an occasional rocket from the surrounding triple canopy jungle. I remember that on one side of the perimeter there was a slight rise to a small ridgeline that afforded protection to these harassment operations that were designed to figure out our defensive strategy and posture.”

The battle for FSB Fort Defiance began about a month before the actual attack. During March, the enemy made several attacks against 1st and 3rd Squadron elements. These attacks started out relatively minor in size and duration but grew over the month until 1/11 and 3/11 engaged sizeable North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces during the last week of March. Regimental intelligence personnel concluded that these attacks were designed to force the Regiment to recall 2nd Squadron from its ongoing interdiction of the enemy’s Saigon-Michelin resupply and infiltration corridor in eastern War Zone C. On 4 April, the 541st Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment noted that the main force units were avoiding contact. “However, there are signs of battlefield preparation in the 11th ACR TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility] with possible targets being FSB DEFIANCE and/or Troop NDPs [night defensive positions].”

Securing Rome Plows from the 984th Land Clearing Company, 2nd Squadron was having considerable success in opening large swaths of the Mustang Trail to aerial surveillance and ground interdiction. The recon troops, supported by Air Cav Troop aero scouts, worked in their separate areas of operation, each about 10-15 kilometers wide. Their mission was to screen the trail networks, looking for signs of enemy movement to the south. Troopers deployed a series of automatic ambushes on a nightly basis, inflicting casualties and instilling fear in the NVA porters and couriers on the trails. First Squadron was accomplishing a similar mission in the western sector of northern War Zone C. Further to the south, two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division were prepared to take on anything that had made its way through the 11th ACR screen. Captured documents from the enemy’s 50th Rear Service Group told of the considerable difficulties they were having in keeping their forward-deployed forces supplied. Communist leaders could not allow this intrusion to continue, so they directed the 7th (NVA) Division to correct the situation. The commander of the 7th (NVA) Division decided that the indirect approach (RPG teams, hit-and-run ambushes, and mines) was not working, so he began to marshal his forces for a direct assault against Fort Defiance. He stealthily moved a reinforced battalion of the 165th Regiment along the eastern edge of the 2/11 sector, then hooked west and north to approach the FSB from an unexpected direction.

On 1 April, Air Cav scouts sighted 30 to 40 enemy personnel moving south along the Mustang Trail. The aero-scouts also uncovered five new trails in the same vicinity, all of which showed signs of recent use. Between April 2nd and 8th, 2/11 Troopers made daily contact with small elements from both regiments of the 7th (NVA) Division and 50th Rear Service Group; in all cases, the enemy quickly broke contact and evaded deeper into the jungle. All three recon troops (E, F, and G) and H Company, as well as the 4th Platoon, 919th Engineers, repeatedly found mines and freshly-dug bunkers along Highway 246 (that runs east-west from Ton Le Cham to Ka Tum) and local route 13 (that runs northeast to southwest from the Minh Thanh Rubber Plantation to Tay Ninh City). On two occasions, they found commo wire stretched across the road, a sure sign that a larger-sized force was in the area and establishing a base camp, probably in preparation for an attack. Documents found on the body of an NVA soldier killed on 4 April identified the C-21 Sapper-Recon Company of the 165th (NVA) Regiment. This enemy soldier was probably part of the recon party planning the attack on Fort Defiance – a fact not missed by the Squadron Intelligence Staff and the 541st MI Detachment.

The final contact with the gathering enemy force before the assault on Fort Defiance itself occurred on 8 April when Chief Warrant Officer 2 Johnny Mallette, piloting an OH-6A with the Squadron Operations Officer (Major Fred Franks) and his crew chief-scout observer aboard, spotted a trail with signs of fresh use. Taking his light observation helicopter (LOH) down to tree-top level, Chief Mallette followed the trail until he saw a group of NVA who appeared to be preparing an ambush position. Almost immediately, the NVA saw the helicopter and took it under small arms and machine gun fire, hitting the aircraft and causing a rapid loss of oil pressure.

Echo Troop, less than a kilometer away, moved to the sound of the guns. According to his Distinguished Flying Cross citation, CW2 Mallette, although wounded, with “calm deliberation … flew phasing patterns to extricate his craft from the enemy ground fire. While still under intense enemy fire and with his leg bleeding profusely, he maneuvered his helicopter to a point behind Troop E and carefully landed without further damaging the craft or injuring the two occupants aboard.” The enemy force, recognizing they had lost the element of surprise, fled into the jungle, ambush mission unaccomplished.

One additional piece of intelligence information provided an indicator of the enemy’s intentions. In the days leading up to 9 April, there was a dramatic increase in the occurrences of ground-to-air fire against Blackhorse helicopters in the vicinity of Fort Defiance. These attacks posed a significant risk to the aviators, as the enemy riflemen had been issued new armor-piercing ammo for their AK-47s. The Regimental intelligence assessment concluded that this increase was not coincidental, but by design: “[T]he increase occurred at the time when the enemy was preparing his battlefield for his attack on Ft Defiance. Therefore, it is felt that the enemy planned this increase and in part used these firings to cover other activities by diverting attention.”

It didn’t work.

The series of contacts with NVA units, all within a radius of about 3 kilometers around Fort Defiance – and several as close as a couple hundred meters – made the enemy’s intentions clear. An attack on the FSB was imminent.

The Troopers didn’t have to wait long. The attack came just after midnight on 9 April. Mortar rounds and rockets rained down inside and outside the perimeter – between 70 and 100 or so 60mm, 82mm, 107mm, 120mm, and 122mm rounds struck in less than 15 minutes. RPGs, caliber .51 machine gun, and AK-47 rifle fire accompanied the barrage of indirect fire. The Commander of the 7th (NVA) Division had assembled a potent force to take on the Blackhorse. The 165th Regiment was reinforced with two sapper companies, an artillery battalion, a mortar company, and an anti-aircraft company.

Inside the perimeter, Hotel Company’s 1st Sergeant, Paul Curran, was earning a Silver Star. Neither the company commander nor the executive officer were at Fort Defiance that night, so the company’s Top Soldier recognized that his leadership and experience would be needed. With incoming rounds impacting all around him, he headed for one of his tanks that was in danger of being destroyed by a fire that started when an RPG struck a barrel of oil. While a medic tended to two wounded crewmen, Top Curran tried to beat the flames out with his flak jacket. When he realized that was not going to happen, he shoveled dirt onto the fire until it was extinguished. Throughout the remainder of the fight, he went from vehicle to vehicle in full sight of the enemy, encouraging the crews, ensuring the wounded were taken care of, and resupplying and redistributing ammo among the tanks. This latter task was especially important, as the crews were using mostly high-explosive HE rounds instead of canister. The Company’s master load plan called for more canister rounds than HE on board the M-48s (appropriate considering the nature of the ‘normal’ threat). Because the enemy gunners did not leave their positions inside the jungle, H Company track commanders (TCs) and loaders were using the high explosive rounds to penetrate the thick vegetation. The First Sergeant had to make sure the crews had enough HE during the fight.

One of the medics who was working the perimeter with Top Curran was Bill Montgomery. When the incoming rounds began to impact inside Fort Defiance, Specialist 4 Montgomery headed for the perimeter. He saw Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Grail Brookshire’s command track ACAV, take an RPG and catch on fire. Disregarding the continuing barrage of mortars and rockets, as well as the flames on the track, the medic knew his duty. His Silver Star citation explains what he did next.

“Specialist Montgomery ran through the fragment torn base and began to administer aid to the wounded crew members. Despite the painful burns, Specialist Montgomery carried the injured soldiers to the aid station. He then returned to the perimeter to insure all wounded personnel had been taken care of.” When the medevac helicopters arrived, he went with the section of Hotel Company tanks to the landing pad. Just before the choppers landed, the enemy let loose another barrage of mortars and rockets. “Specialist Montgomery instructed the wounded to take cover but remained exposed to the enemy rounds to direct the helicopters away from the area.” Only after all the wounded had been cared for did Bill Montgomery allow another medic to take care of his own severe burns.

Things were especially hot and heavy in the Howitzer Battery area of the FSB. Within minutes of the first rounds impacting at Fort Defiance, the four howitzers were in action. The deadlined (non-operational for maintenance reasons) Number 6 gun provided illumination (because there was no engine in the vehicle, all traversing, elevating, and loading had to be done by hand), while the other three howitzers fired counter-battery missions. An incoming RPG hit the Number 6 piece, blowing off the entire caliber .50 mount. The Number 5 piece was hit twice, first by an RPG that penetrated the engine compartment and started a fire, and a second time by an 82mm mortar that struck the ammo bunker next to the howitzer. Two layers of sandbags and an Air Force pallet did their job by absorbing the blast and the ammunition didn’t explode. Another 82mm mortar struck the berm next to the Number 4 piece, starting a fire in one of the powder bags. The crew quickly put the fire out before it caused any further damage. Altogether, almost 40 mortar, rocket, and RPG 2 rounds impacted in the Battery area.

The attack on Fort Defiance was over in under an hour, although the enemy’s Z-22 Artillery Battalion fired another 50 or so mortar rounds and rockets against the FSB after daybreak. The better part of a reinforced NVA regiment was in position for an assault on the base, but no ground attack came – probably because of the heavy volume of machine gun, 90mm main gun, and artillery fire that was coming their way, as well as the obvious lack of catastrophic destruction inside the berm.

Bill Gregory probably spoke for many of the 2/11 Troopers inside the berm that night: “I’d say we probably won that fight because we, we inflicted quite a bit of damage on them. But it was, it was kind of scary there for a while. Because, you know … when you’re in a fire fight for that long a period of time you begin to wonder, we’re doing great now but can we keep this up? ... We just put out as much firepower as we could and we were able to keep them from getting inside.”

 

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