4th Quarter, 2024

Blackhorse Troopers All!

Over the course of its 5 ½ years in Southeast Asia, the number of personnel assigned, attached, and under the operational control (OPCON) to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment varied greatly from year to year. The following are a few examples.

Organic Personnel. In early 1968, Colonel Roy Farley (35th Colonel of the Regiment), wrote in Armor magazine that changes in equipment – such as eliminating the M48 tanks and M114 recon vehicles from the recon platoons and replacing them with M113 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAVs) – led to significant personnel changes. “Prior to deployment, major equipment changes were made to better suit the tactical units for operations in the jungles and rice paddies expected to characterize the area of operations … Changes in the personnel area, generated by the aforementioned equipment changes as well as other additions deemed necessary to flesh out the regiment’s combat support activities, resulted in an increase in strength from 3040 officers and men in TOE [Table of Organization & Equipment] 17-51E to the currently authorized total of 3672. In addition, various companies and detachments were attached to the regiment bringing the total for the entire combat team up to 4112 officers and men.”

In addition to the personnel required to operate as a combat unit, the Regiment also had the burden of running a 568-acre base camp – Blackhorse Base Camp near Long Giao – with between 5,000 and 6,000 permanent and transitory residents. This was a huge burden not envisioned in the TO&E. The Regimental S-1 (RS-1) assumed many of the administrative types of such activities – for example, the complex task of reporting and tracking casualties of the combat operations side, and running the Post Exchange (PX) on the base camp side. In mid-1967, Blackhorse 6 told his boss that he had, on a daily basis, “a minimum requirement for 15 officers, 41 NCO, and 142 EM for strictly base camp operations.”

On first day of Operation Junction City in the spring of 1967, 96 Blackhorse Troopers were either killed or wounded. They were medevaced to 16 different hospitals throughout the Saigon area. The RS-1 two-man casualty reporting section was overwhelmed and had to be augmented to handle this task. Ten Troopers at one time staffed this section just to handle casualty reporting and tracking. It took another 15 people to run the PX. By mid-1967, there were 179 Troopers (officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted) to run all aspects of the RS-1 business (personnel, administrative, and related activities) – about three times the authorized strength.

The RS-1 was not alone in this regard. Even the RS-3 (operations & training) section – ‘rich’ in assets when compared to the RS-1 section’s TO&E – also was stretched to the limit. When 2nd Lieutenant (2LT) Scott Crissman reported in to the Regiment in the late summer of 1969, he was told that he was “excess”. But not to worry, they had a job for him; the RS-3 welcomed him and told him he was the new OIC (officer in charge) of the alternate regimental command post located at An Loc. This was a time of significant enemy activity, and An Loc was known to be a prime target for the expected North Vietnamese attack. The RS-3 section, already stretched thin with full-scale Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) at Blackhorse Base Camp and Quan Loi, established a mini-TOC at An Loc (collocated with the South Vietnamese Binh Long Province Chief’s TOC), as well as another at Bu Dop (collocated with the Special Forces detachment). The An Loc TOC was located approximately 30 feet underground in a concrete bunker built by Japanese troops during World War II. LT Crissman’s first combat command consisted of an NCOIC, six radio-telephone operators (RTOs), one ACAV, one ¾-ton truck, and several radios. Their mission, in addition to deconflicting Blackhorse and South Vietnamese Army operations and calls for fire, was to coordinate 11th Cav pile-on forces (air, ground, and artillery) in case An Loc came under attack. Which it did, in August 1969. “Excess” indeed!

Attached Personnel. At one point, there were 19 separate units attached or OPCON to the Regiment in Vietnam. The following are but two of these members of the Blackhorse Team.

1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion.

The detachment of Military Police (MPs) that joined the Blackhorse Team was one of the first attachments after the 11th Cav came ashore at Vung Tau. Unlike the separate infantry brigades (like the 173rd Airborne Brigade, each of which had an organic MP platoon), there were no MPs in the TO&E of an Armored Cavalry Regiment. As a result, the 720th Military Police Battalion at Long Binh was directed to provide MP support to the Regiment, first at the Long Binh Staging Area and then at Blackhorse Base Camp. Bravo Company received that mission on 5 November 1967.

As far as the Regiment was concerned, the MP’s primary mission was convoy escort and traffic control for the daily logistics convoys that ran between Long Binh and Blackhorse Base Camp. This mission was called Operation Overseer by the MPs, and all companies from the 720th participated at one time or another. For the MPs, however, more traditional missions, including law and order patrols and Prisoner of War security at the base camp, as well as law and order patrols in Xuan Loc, were their primary focus. During field operations, the MP detachment was beefed up; for example, one officer and 23 EM were OPCON to the Regiment during Operation Manhattan in April 1967. During Operation Paddington with the Australians in July 1967, the MPs of Bravo Company were the first in Vietnam to use the V-100 armored car during tactical operations. At various times, A and C Companies of the 720th MP Battalion supplemented or relieved Bravo Company of the 11th Cav support mission. The convoy escort mission between Long Binh and Long Giao terminated in October 1969 when the Regiment departed Blackhorse Base Camp.

It wasn’t until late July 1969 that the MP-Cav arrangement was made ‘permanent’. Captain Robert Anderson was assigned as the first Blackhorse Provost Marshal, and the squad of MPs that had been in direct support for almost three years was assigned to the Regiment and expanded to a platoon. There were two major impacts resulting from this organizational change. First, the MPs now worked for Blackhorse 6, not an MP lieutenant colonel in Long Binh. Second, the MPs ripped off the 18th MP Brigade patch and replaced it with a Blackhorse patch. The mission of the military policemen also changed when they assumed responsibility for securing the regimental headquarters in garrison and in the field.

While the Blackhorse Troopers assigned to convoy security rode in armored vehicles, until mid-1967 the MPs rode in ¼-ton jeeps. Sandbags on the floorboards and across the hood offered only limited protection against mines and small arms. In addition to the driver and OIC/NCOIC, a third MP rode in the back to man a pedestal-mounted M-60 machine gun – rat patrol style. The weapon sported no shield, so that MP’s only protection was his helmet and flak jacket. Starting in July 1967, the MP escorts rode in a mix of V-100 armored cars and armored gun jeeps.

5th Field Team, Company B, 6th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Battalion.

Operation Atlanta (late 1966 to mid-1967), during which the 11th Cav moved into the Blackhorse Base Camp, witnessed the initial PSYOPs campaign conducted by the Regiment. The Regimental S-5 designed two separate leaflets, one for the ‘friendly’ people of Long Khanh Province, and one for the ‘unfriendly’ people. The ‘friendly’ leaflet showed the proposed regimental patch and informed the people that the Blackhorse Regiment was here to stay and to help them against the VC. The ‘unfriendly’ leaflet showed a tank running over some guerrillas and warned the VC that their time was up. A total of 500,000 friendly and unfriendly leaflets were dropped from circling aircraft. They were accompanied by broadcasts from speakers mounted in a Huey helicopter announcing the arrival of the Blackhorse Troopers.

For the next five years, the PSYOPs Troopers worked on the minds and morale of the enemy. When a Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldier gave himself up – Chieu Hoi’d – he was interviewed by the RS-5. If he was willing, the PSYOPs field team printed a new leaflet, featuring the Chieu Hoi’s picture and a personalized appeal for his comrades to follow his lead. A quick-reaction leaflet to exploit the Communist defector could be prepared in six hours. Within eight hours, the leaflet could be dropped on a suspected VC base camp. At the same time, the defector broadcast his message on the airborne 1,000-watt loudspeaker. The capture of a cache also led to a new leaflet, with a picture of the weapons, food, and medicine. The accompanying message told the enemy that we had his supplies now. Communist officers might convince their subordinates that the pictures and words were forgeries; the man’s voice, however, couldn’t be faked.

Most of the time, the PSYOPS warriors couldn’t prove that their broadcasts and leaflets were having the desired effect. But in mid-1969, they could draw a straight line from their operations to an enemy defection.

In July, a 27-year old VC Chieu Hoi’d to the South Vietnamese 9th Infantry Regiment. He told his interrogators that life in the jungle was hard and getting harder all the time. When he heard the Blackhorse helicopter fly overhead, he listened carefully to the message being broadcast. It was that message that convinced him to give up the fight and turn himself in. Ten more NVA did so as well in August and September, all stating that the aerial appeals had been the crucial element in their decision to surrender.

Defectors making live appeals to their former comrades via airborne loudspeakers was one of the most effective tools available to the 6th PSYOPers. However, there was one unexpected side effect of this approach. As one after-action report noted: “VC/NVA consistently become airsick after a short time in a helicopter.” As a result, the former enemy soldier was asked to make a tape, which was then broadcast over the area from which he rallied.

In March 1970, the Regiment was operating near the Cambodian border north and west of Quan Loi. The mission was to interdict enemy supply and infiltration activities originating inside Cambodia and headed for main force units between Tay Ninh and An Loc. During this period, the automatic ambush was proving to be one of the most effective weapons against the small NVA patrols working the intricate trail network. The Blackhorse PSYOPS Troopers, along with the Regimental S-2 (Intelligence), decided to tweak the enemy’s natural curiosity. During daylight hours, Troopers emplaced a Vietnamese-language banner just south of Highway 246, urging the enemy soldiers to rally to the South Vietnamese side. After darkness, 1st Squadron Troopers emplaced an automatic ambush near the banner. A mounted platoon from Charlie Troop waited in the dark just 25 meters away. Sure enough, at 0550 hours – less than an hour before dawn – the automatic ambush detonated. That was the signal the Troopers had been waiting for, and they peppered the area with Sheridan main gun, mortar, and 155mm rounds from 1st-HOW. A first-light sweep found two dead NVA soldiers, four packs, and a CHICOM radio. Human curiosity knows no nationality or cultural barriers.

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